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ABSTRACT
The paper aims to highlight the nature and the relevance of the reference to constitutional traditions in the
building of populist constitutionalism, with special regard to the Hungarian case. In Hungary the goals and
effects of this reference – especially the references to the achievements of the historical constitution – must
be discussed at the level of the constitutional text and with regard to the formation of the new constitu-
tional jurisprudence and, furthermore, to the creation of the constitutional identity. Outstanding political
theories have been built about the elements of national populism and all include a political emphasis on a
nation’s pride in its culture, history and traditions. This paper examines the normative legal consequences
of this in a state where the populist political forces have consecutively gained a majority in the Parliament
which enables them to adopt and amend a constitution and decide on the personal make up of the
constitutional court. It examines the role of the reference to constitutional traditions in the transformation
of the constitutional system. The illustrative case studies from Hungary show one element of the alternative
to mainstream liberal constitutional democracy: a constitutional perception of the sovereign people with a
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strong common constitutional heritage, this latter to be respected by all state organs and by domestic,
European and international law. The paper offers an understanding of this constitutional concept and
assembles disclaimers and serious legal concerns that must be taken into account, at least in Hungary, but
probably in many other national populist regimes as well.
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populist constitutionalism, Hungarian constitutionalism, the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the historical constitu-
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1. INTRODUCTION1
How is that nativist, authoritarian populisms have become so powerful worldwide? asked Bojan
Bugaric, one of the leading scholars of populism, in the German Law Journal in 2019. To be
attractive to citizens populist policy making is focused on creating a constitutional environment
for its operation to prove the maintenance of the rule of law instead of the prerogative state. The
reinterpretation of popular sovereignty, constitution making, and the creation of a constitutional
identity are three elements to be measured in populist constitutional change.2 In Hungary, the
reference to constitutional traditions has played an important role – in structuring the people as
the source of the sovereignty, in the analysis of the constitution making itself, and equally in the
assessment of the creation of the constitutional identity since 2010.
This paper attempts to investigate this important element of populist constitutionalism,
especially of national populist constitutionalism. In Hungary one of the strengths of the new
constitutionalism after the 2010 was that not only the political rhetoric but also the related
constitutional law started to base its legitimacy on a reference to national traditions. Hungary
could be a litmus paper to examine this phenomenon, because in 2010 the Fidesz-KDNP party
coalition won a two thirds majority in Parliament, which is a constitution making and
constitution amending majority.3 Therefore, for the populist party, i.e. for Fidesz, it was possible
to go beyond the rhetoric and start amending the constitution immediately in 2010. By the
adoption of the new constitution in 2011, and following this, by the 9 amendments to the
Fundamental Law4 (constitution) the Government majority could easily implement in the
constitution and in the legal system all the changes that it found necessary for the establishment
of the new regime.
Luigi Correas writes, in relation to constitutional identity as collective statehood, that for
populist regimes constitutional identity is undoubtedly one of the three most important re-
constructions of populist constitutionalism.5 Roger Eatwell and Mattheu Goodwin, in their book
on national populism as a revolt against liberal democracy, call attention to the role of national
1Bugaric (2019) 390–91.
2Correas (2016).
3See, Szente and Gardos-Orosz (2018).
4Drinoczi et al. (2019).
5Correas (2016).
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traditions in the creation of the constitutional identity of national populism.6 When Bojan
Bugaric describes the ‘false promises of quick fixes’,7 the creation of a constitutional identity
and the promise to lead society back to its strong constitutional traditions appear to be ex-
amples of these promises. Mudde and Kaltwasser, in their very brief introduction to populism,
write about culture as a component of the notion of the people in some populist regimes.
Therefore, the reinterpretation of popular sovereignty as a basic element of populism, and the
reorganisation of the components of the notion of the people, is essential.8 Jan-Werner M€uller
also points out that populists reject political representation as the representation of the volonte
general according to Rousseau’s conception. Populists rather talk about the Volksgeist, where
the identity and the common culture is much more important then the actual will of the
numerical majority (democracy as a pure majority rule).9 Blokker, taking this line of thought
even further, argues that ‘the people’ is not a real entity for the populists, in the sense that the
concept of the people does not focus on society, it is rather that the people and popular
sovereignty have a transcendent, metaphysical content; the people is a ‘collective subject’ in its
own right, based on the traditions, the common suffering in the past and the history that
unites a people.10 This is where the constitutional traditions fit in, regardless of whether these
elements are real or assumed. The idea that common traditions and culture, specifically legal
traditions and legal culture are important for statehood is no doubt a true statement. The
question is how this reference is used in a modern legal system with a charter constitution
where populists rule. What is the place, the role, the nature and the achievements of this
proposal and the concerns surrounding it? The paper aims to discuss this problem by
demonstrating it through the Hungarian case.
In the first part of this paper (I), I will describe the elements of constitutional populism in
general and pay special attention to national populism, as it appears in the academic literature
(1.1). After this, I explain the Hungarian case and review the literature proving that the
constitutional change that started in 2010 – which produced the Fundamental Law and has so
far seen nine amendments to it – is a populist political change with constitutional (and other
legal) consequences (1.2). In the second section (II.), I will describe the references in the
Fundamental Law to constitutional culture and history, with special regard to the role of the
achievements of the historical constitution and the related case law (2.1), before finally turning
to the Seventh amendment concerning the introduction of the constitutional identity and also to
the description of the related case law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (2.2). Throughout
the second part of the paper I will continuously reflect on the literature that examines the
original, historical content of the special notions used in the language of the new constitution,
the 2011 Fundamental Law.
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2. CONSTITUTIONAL POPULISM
Blokker and Anselmi, acknowledged scholars of populism, when giving a definition of consti-
tutional populism write that constitutional populism emerges when populists have state au-
thority, obtain power and get into a position in which they are able to influence the content of
the constitution. In this case they can influence constitutionalism in a given country.11 In Latin
America, for example, there are the cases of Chavez’s Venezuela and Morales’ Bolivia, while in
Europe, the constitutional reform carried out by the populist leader in Hungary is particularly
emblematic. If we accept the term constitutional populism in spite of the fact that the expression
might seem an oxymoron, we can further accept that the basic populist scheme is the ‘the
sovereign people-as-one’.12
Paul Blokker identified four analytical aspects of constitutional populism: popular will,
majoritarianism, legal resentment and constitutional instrumentalism.13 By the term ‘popular
will’, Blokker meant an idealized idea of the people, which is used to build a constitutional
architecture alternative to the liberal one.14 In this framework, the constitution becomes the
main instrument that strengthens the absolute control of political power based on the con-
struction of the idealised people as a united nation with a common constitutional heritage.15
2.1. Populist constitutionalism, the people, the nation and its history
Even though the use of ‘constitutional populism’ is relatively widespread in legal research, the
phrase has no universally accepted definition. In fact, the meaning depends largely on the
context. It has been used in descriptions of the Chinese legal system (or at least a tendency
within that system) to prefer the interest of the people over the professional elites.16 There is
only one known attempt at the theorisation of legal pragmatism, coming from within legal
pragmatist quarters; in it the attitude of American law is understood, which prefers the general
good of the public and the extension of equal rights over partial interests.17 The context given by
Blatt and other American scholars for populism is unrelated to the legal reflection of political
populism in Europe.18 In the USA, it has been a part of the classical debates surrounding judicial
review, just like ‘popular constitutionalism’, since the turn of the millennium. In those debates,
‘populism’ is not a pejorative word, but one that reflects support for a moderate judicial role, as
opposed to judicial activism. The publication that spurred the most widespread academic dis-
cussion was Mark Tushnet’s Taking the Constitution away from the Courts in 1999.19
11Blokker (2013) and Anselmi (2018) 87.
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Legal discussion of populism is scarce and is mainly restricted to the fields of constitutional
law or constitutional theory. The relevant literature has not established or differentiated the
main theoretical trends in the discussion of the legal effects of political populism. Legal research
has mainly focused on the description and classification of the legal effects of populism in
general. This point is also understood by those involved in the discussion on constitutional
populism.
There have been various conceptualisations of the phenomenon in legal studies, and it re-
mains rather unclear. The terminology used has been largely influenced by the political science
that underpins it; i.e. it is connected to the evaluation of the political systems under investi-
gation. Therefore, ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ is mentioned,20 as well as ‘autocratic
legalism’,21 ‘hybrid constitutionalism’22 and ‘illiberal constitutionality’.23 There are a great
number of publications with ‘populist constitutionalism’ or a similar phrase in the title.24
The last few years have seen a significant rise in publications which analyse the legal effects of
political populism. So far, however, descriptive and comparative studies have dominated the
field, with relatively little by way of independent theoretical work on the European experience
(the most important exceptions include works by David Landau, Bojan Bugaric, Paul Blokker
and Jan-Werner M€uller, Gabor Halmai etc.).25 Recently, a number of new studies have been
published which are aimed at the protection of liberal democracy, or examine its prospects, or
recommend ways to stop its erosion.26 A different terminology was proposed in the literature, in
addition to populist constitutionalism or illiberal constitutionalism, the so called ‘hybrid regime’
introduced by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way;27 the authors – all capturing one or other
aspect of the issue – focus on the democratic change.
Populist constitutional claims emerge within a constitutional democracy. Although schol-
arship usually contrasts liberal constitutionalism with illiberal constitutionalism, and populist
with non-populist constitutionalism etc. as I have explained above, it is a fact that these claims
appear in old or new constitutional democracies that operate according to well known rules of
constitutionalism. The debate about the elements of populist constitutionalism is therefore
difficult to identify, because even in states like Hungary, where the populist Government has had
a two thirds constitution making majority since 2010 – the old rule is still present in words and
in minds. Populist constitutionalism is not written on a blank piece of paper but written between
the lines or over the rows of the written constitutional and other legal texts. It is not always
obvious what constitutes a new element that can be qualified as an element of the new populist
constitutionalism. As the concept develops within the framework of liberal democracy and
transforms it step by step, the analysis needs time before we can describe the entire constitu-




23Drinoczi and Kacała (2020).
24See e.g., M€uller (2018). Landau (2018).
25See further Toth (2019) 37–61; Halmai (2019b) 296–313. Drinoczi and Bien-Kacała (2019) 1,141, 1,148.
26See e.g. Ginsburg and Huq (2019).
27Levitsky and Way (2010). Way (2015).
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methodological difficulty could be solved by restricting the analysis to one element and assessing
whether it is plausible (suitable to the legal system) in a constitutional democracy. By building a
structure from the elements that do not appear to be plausible in an established constitutional
democracy, we will become able to define populist constitutionalism as something different from
classical constitutionalism. Using this methodological approach this paper examines the role of
the constitutional traditions in law, and specifically the reference to the so called historical
constitution in Hungary as a source of law in the contemporary legal order based on the
Fundamental Law of 2011.
In spite of its uncertain content, populism is a good framework for the analysis of the
criticism levelled at the constitutional state, because it does not mean anything,28 even though it
refers to a claim to alter or to change democracy. Populists want to make a difference, no matter
in what direction; right or left,29 good30 or bad.31 When building this structure step by step, we
will see in the end what kind of populism was created in a certain country in relation to liberal
constitutional democracy as the comparatum. There will be similarities and differences in these
structures and in the end we can compare them. This methodology is, of course, already applied
in legal scholarship and in political sciences and there are some common features of the regimes
we qualify as being in a constitutional transformation.
Zoltan Szente, in the introductory chapter of the book Populist Challenges to Constitutional
Interpretation in Europe and Beyond, identifies the elements of populist constitutionalism in the
negative and in the positive sense, based upon a wide review of the literature in law and in
political science. He describes how these elements can be found to different extents in different
countries, but in the legal and political science scholarship, these characteristics appear to be
basic elements of the concept of populist constitutionalism. The elements are the following: (1) a
criticism of the separation of law and politics, stating that populists reject the restriction of
political power by legal norms, and they reject the politically neutral conception of law in liberal
democracy because it undermines the representation of the national interest; and (2) anti-
elitism, the juxtaposition of the virtuous people and the corrupt elite, and reference to a united
people (nation, community) as opposed to a privileged cosmopolitan elite (with international
organizations or EU institutions, NGOs included) that protects the rights of LGBTQ commu-
nities or immigrants, alternative churches or other minorities that do not represent the majority
interest.32 Anti-institutionalism, anti-pluralism, and anti-liberalism are the next components
that Szente identifies in the literature,33 together with the logic that public interest and the
general will of the people should take precedence over individual and particular interests.
Among the positive criteria of populist constitutionalism, Szente identifies popular sover-
eignty first. The populist interpretation of constituent power puts the rule of the people above
the rule of law; a ‘collective subject’ moulded by tradition, common suffering and destiny re-
ceives greater competence in direct decision making. Populist constitutionalism can be
28Arter (2011) 490.
29Tushnet and Bugaric (2020).
30Batt (1995) 651–762.
31Blokker (2017).
32See Szente (2021) 3–28.
33Szente (2021) 3–28.
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characterized by the absolutization of the majority principle, as long as the populist parties have
won the election. This majoritarian conception of democracy regards electoral empowerment as
an expression of the will of the people and, on that basis, rejects the constitutional restriction of
power.34 The instrumentalization of the law means, in regimes like Hungary, that the consti-
tution can provide an effective toolbox for preserving power and breaking down checks and
balances while the formalities of the rule of law are observed; therefore, these populist regimes
are characterized by active constitution-making, as far as this is possible for them.35
Francisco Balaguer Callejon explains that there is an unresolvable tension between the
populist idea and constitutionalism however, because constitutionalism is based on the idea of
pluralism with regard to the nation – the people –, and on the inherent limitation of majority
opinion, while populists usually demand that the will of the majority triumphs, and if populists
obtain authority over the state they implement this will in the forms of constitutions, consti-
tutional amendments and other legal norms.36 An example could be cited from Spain, where
secessionists accept the constitutional framework, but when it is against their goals they appeal
to a superior will of the ‘people’ whom they alone represent. It is, however, not the will of the
real, plural people, i.e. the people that express themselves through democratic institutions under
the rule of law; rather, it is they themselves constituted as a unique ‘people’, from which they
exclude the majority of citizens because they do not coincide with their conception of people.37
The reinterpretation of the general ideas of constitutionalism with special regard to popular
sovereignty is often mentioned as a per se populist phenomenon. Primarily, the thoughts of U.S.
President Abraham Lincoln are used: ‘A Government of the people, by the people, and for the
people’ to reflect on the notion of popular sovereignty as the basis of the democratic order. In
relation to this, the phrase ‘Give the Government back to the people’ is often heard as a criticism
of liberal democracy during constitutional transformations.
It is especially typical that national populism highlights the nation as a cultural unity with a
national history to be proud of.38 According to Eatwell and Goodwin, national populism is a
movement that in the early years of the 21st century is increasingly challenging mainstream
politics in the West. National populism prioritizes the culture and tradition that belong to the
nation, the promise to give voice to a united people. Hungary is classified as a national populist
example in this volume. Kaltwasser and Mudde also explain that this form of populism em-
phasizes that the ultimate source of the people is a collective body, i.e. the nation. The ‘common
people’ is a central notion which refers explicitly or implicitly to a class concept, ‘that combines
socioeconomic status with specific constitutional traditions and popular values’. When populists
speak about the people it is often to critique the dominant state, the institutions, procedures, and
the ruling culture.39 In opposition to liberal democracy where ‘the people’ is a word for the
integrative and inclusive political community (political nation), in the populist dictionary the
people as the source of political power is rather an exclusive and well defined community often
34Szente (2021) 3–28.
35Szente (2021) 3–28.
36Balaguer Callejon (2021). Balaguer Callejon (2020).
37Balaguer Callejon (2021).
38Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) 32.
39Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) 10–11.
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based on common cultural, historical religious grounds. Traditions, especially constitutional
traditions might be important elements of this new theocratization of the people, the cultural
nation.
Cathrine Colliot-Thelene compares how left wing and right wing populisms construct the
people and concludes that it is impossible to define the question of the redefinition of the people
by populists, because the reference to the people as the source of political power is very different
in the different theories.40 Manuel Anselmi, however, in his introduction to populism offers a
proposition that we should still study the transformation of the notion of the people, in order to
understand the operation of a populist regime like Hungary, because this is one key element of
constitutional populism.41
The notion of the people in the wide palette of understanding is a common element;
therefore, I have chosen to examine this in more detail in Hungary, with special regard to the
efforts to create a united nation by constituent power and legislative means. Within this effort I
have identified the reference to the constitutional traditions that appears to be a common value
in the legal texts that serve a basis for the construction of the people and its constitution. Thus
far this would be neither unique nor specific in a discussion on populist constitutional changes
around the world, but one thing related to this makes the Hungarian case specific in a global
context. The reference to constitutional traditions in the constitutional text is not only an
ornament in the preamble, not only an anthemic statement, nor only a political statement, but –
according to the intentions of the constitution making power42 – a separate normative order that
is fused with the charter constitution, i.e. with the Fundamental Law. Constitutional traditions
must be respected when interpreting the constitutional text and other legal texts, and thus, in
order to oppose the classic liberal written constitution a hybrid constitution is created, where the
past binds the present and the future. The well known dilemma of intergenerational justice43 in
liberal constitutional democracy has become nuanced by this concept, in which the present
binds the future by the past. This is a spectacular contribution to the discussion on time,44 law
and change, because the Hungarian populist power created a hybrid constitution where the
achievements of the historical constitution bind the interpretation of the constitutional court
and ordinary courts and legislation and where this construction is integrated into the notion of
the constitutional identity which aims to define the unamendable core of the constitution. All
this is done in order to identify the uniform nation – the people – with a common constitutional
heritage which is binding for the past, present and the future, and which creates the constitution.
2.2. Populist constitutionalism in Hungary
Hungary is a country where the government parties enjoy huge popular support, and a
constitution-making majority in Parliament.45 In the general elections of 2010, the former
40Fitzi and Mackert (2018) 23–25.
41Anselmi (2018) 87–91.
42See the interviews in Ablonczy (2011); Molnar, Nemeth and Toth (2013); Vızkelety (2017).
43Albert (2017) 18–31.
44Ranchordas and Roznai (2020).
45This part is based on a previous analysis published as Gardos-Orosz (2021).
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rightist opposition party, Fidesz, and its partner Christian Democratic Party won a landslide
victory, and the new government acquired a two-thirds majority under the new favourable
electoral rules. In spring of 2011, the Parliament, in the absence of the two democratic oppo-
sition parties (which, protesting against the ‘destruction of the rule of law’, boycotted the whole
constitution-making process), approved a new Fundamental Law of Hungary.
The new Fundamental Law, which entered into force on 1 January 2012, introduced certain
explicit principles and methods of constitutional interpretation. The original standards of
constitutional review were established by the Constitutional Court in the 1990s. The most
important interpretive tool was the so-called ‘necessity-proportionality test’, by which the Court
constantly reviewed the constitutionality of rights-limitations, based more or less on the pattern
of the jurisdiction of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. This approach was codified by the
Fundamental Law in Art. 1.46 Another major general rule on constitutional interpretation was,
however, introduced in Art. R para (3) of the Fundamental Law. According to Article R para (3),
the provisions of the Fundamental Law must be interpreted (a) ‘in accordance with their purposes’,
(b) ‘with the Avowal of National Faith’, and (c) ‘with the achievements of our historical consti-
tution’. Section (4) of the same Article states that ‘the protection of the constitutional identity and
the Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State’. According to
Art. N) para (1) ‘In the course of performing their duties, the Constitutional Court, courts, local
governments and other state organs shall be bound to respect the principle that Hungary shall
enforce the principle of balanced, transparent and sustainable budget management.’47
The composition of the Constitutional Court was completely changed, as well. Just a few
months after its formation in 2010, the new coalition government, using its two-thirds majority
transformed the process of nominating the judges of the Constitutional Court. Since then, the
membership of the parliamentary committee responsible for the nomination is no longer based
on parity, but has reflected the party-strength in the Parliament. Besides this, Art. 24 of the
Fundamental Law introduced a new design, with 15 judges instead of the former 11. The new
constitution empowered Parliament to elect the head of the Court (previously, he or she was
elected by the justices themselves).
Both the constitution-making process, and the following amending and legislative activity
led not only to fierce debates in the country, but caused a stir on the international level as well.48
The reason for this attention and the heavy criticism was that the measures of the two
consecutive Orban Governments after 2010 systematically dismantled the principles of the
separation of powers and the rule of law.49 These developments and events aroused much
46‘The rules relating to fundamental rights and obligations shall be laid down in Acts. A fundamental right may only be
restricted in order to allow the exercise of another fundamental right or to protect a constitutional value, to the extent
that is absolutely necessary, proportionately to the objective pursued, and respecting the essential content of such
fundamental right.’ Art. I. para (3) of the Fundamental Law.
47Drinoczi, Chronowski and Kocsis (2012) 41–64.
48Halmai (2019a).
49For a more detailed description of this process, see Kovacs and Toth (2011) 183–203; Pogany (2013) 341–67; Bankuti,
Halmai and Scheppele (2012a) 138–46; Bankuti, Halmai and Scheppele (2012b) 237–68.
On the international level, the European Parliament and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe have
adopted a number of resolutions and opinions criticizing the backsliding on the rule of law in Hungary. See in details
Szente (2017).
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criticism in international fora, and induced the EU institutions to establish a mechanism for
controlling the state of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights in the member
states.
The prime minister Viktor Orban, in a speech in July 2014 openly expressed his views
about the policy objectives of the government. While praising Singapore, China, India,
Turkey, and Russia as ‘making [their] nations successful’, and as the new ‘stars of interna-
tional analyses’, he said that ‘the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-
liberal state’.50
Since the Constitutional Court had been from its very beginnings a powerful counter-
balance of the executive power, it is not surprising that the body was involved in consti-
tutional changes. By 2016, all judges of the Constitutional Court were elected for 12 years
instead of the former 9 year term and all of them are approved, if not appointed, by the
ruling majority.51
The Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law in March 2013, with the apparent purpose
of forcing the body to change its interpretive practice, repealed all the rulings of the Consti-
tutional Court made prior to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law (1st January 2012).52
The same amendment which created a hostile environment, openly overruled many former
Constitutional Court decisions that had declared important legislative acts of the government
majority in Parliament unconstitutional, by inscribing the controversial provisions into the text
of the Fundamental Law in order to eliminate any further judicial review.53
If we analyse the reasons for the changes of the constitutional environment and especially of
the practice of the Constitutional Court since 2010, we can conclude that the world financial
crisis, the terrorist danger, the flow of migrants or any other new challenges do not give plausible
explanations for the fundamental changes that occurred. Most changes in constitutional juris-
prudence have been brought about by the unquestionable semi-authoritarian tendencies
building up a so-called ‘illiberal democracy’, or populist constitutionalism rejecting institutional
counterbalances against the executive power and building on its own a state which is based on
the united nation.
Of course, even a ‘new authoritarianism’ might be considered as a special response to the
modern challenges of our world. However, if one considers this a realistic option, real answers
should be given to emerging problems. Our related question is whether the new Hungarian
government’s goal to connect a chosen narrative of the past, the present and the future in the
normative framework of the constitution appears to be a plausible (legally suitable) solution, or
is only a surprising but apparently impossible promise of a quick fix. The attempt is clear – to
create a nation according to the theories discussed above. The Hungarian Government majority
would like to create a Hungarian nation that supports its constitutional policy and votes for
them. This Hungarian nation is composed of Hungarians who have common constitutional
traditions, meaning common values that they share and teach.
50The whole speech can be found at http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2014/07/31/viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-
xxv-balvanyos-free-summer-university-and-youth-camp-july-26-2014-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo/.
51Szente (2016b) 123–49.
52Sonnevend, Jakab and Csink (2015) 68.; Uitz (2016) 396.
53Solyom (2015) 22.
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3. THE ‘CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION’ IN HUNGARY
The preamble of the new Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011 declares that ‘[w]e honour the
achievements of our historical constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the
constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of the nation. We do not recognise
the suspension of our historical constitution due to foreign occupations.’
The first chapter of the constitution (‘Foundations’), in its Art. I, Para. (1), designating the
state symbols, says that in the coat of arms, ‘[t]he Holy Crown shall rest on top of the shield’.
Although the Holy Crown was already recognized by law as a state symbol in 2010,54 it only
gained real constitutional importance as a principle of constitutional interpretation with the
Fundamental Law. Nevertheless, it is still not clear yet, what the significance of the historical
constitution and its inherent element, the doctrine of the Holy Crown, is in building the nation’s
constitutional identity, and what normative consequences they have in constitutional law and
interpretation. Almost ten years after the adoption of the Fundamental Law, the achievements of
the historical constitution since 2017 form part of the constitutional identity, which is a con-
struction designed to enforce the core of the constitution so that it becomes more stable against
change and external intrusion.
Hungary is said to have a 1,000 year old constitutionality, starting from the foundation of the
state by Stephen I of Hungary. Hungary’s 1,000 years of constitutionality, however, is different
from the 1000-year constitutionalism of England.55 Before the adoption of the first written
constitution of Hungary in 1949, the so-called historical constitution was in effect; however,
Hungary, in her long history, was occupied by foreign powers many times, which interrupted
constitutional continuity.56 The text of the new fundamental law claims that the legal continuity
of the historical constitution was broken only by the Nazi occupation in 1944, but the opponents
of the revival of the historical constitution and the claim for its legal continuity argue that the
continuity of the historical constitution cannot established by a contemporary constitutional
charter, therefore the suggestion of the hybrid concept is arbitrary and unviable.57
Looking back on Hungarian history, a reference to the elements of the constitutional
tradition was usually an ornament of the explanation, used to back up certain institutional or
procedural changes as an additional argument, but constitutional traditions usually did not
affect any restraint on the political process.58 The reference to the constitutional traditions were
part of the historical interpretation, which was a conventional way of interpretation in search of
additional legal arguments to back up the ratio decidendi of the decision. The constitutional
tradition itself was not a legal term in Hungarian law, but was rather present in the political and
constitutional discourse in relation to EU law and EU constitutionalism.
The word, tradition is mentioned only twice in the Fundamental Law, but never in the
context of constitutional tradition. In Article U) of the Fundamental Law the text condemns the
54See the Act No. LXXXIII of 1995 on the national symbols of the Republic of Hungary, and the Act No. I of 2000 on the
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former communist political order: ‘The state structure based on the rule of law, established in
accordance with the will of the nation through the first free elections held in 1990, and the
previous communist dictatorship are incompatible’. The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party
and its legal predecessors and the other political organisations established to serve them in the
spirit of communist ideology were criminal organisations, and their leaders shall have re-
sponsibility without statute of limitations for, among many others, f) systematically devastating
the traditional values of European civilisation.’ As I will explain, the traditional values in this
context are not the values of liberal constitutionalism, but rather general claims of humanity.
The word tradition appears again in another provision as religious tradition in the National
Avowal (Preamble) of the text: ‘We recognise the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood.
We value the various religious traditions of our country’. No other mention is present in the text
of the Fundamental Law. The word tradition is used rather generally in legal scholarship.
Tradition, legal tradition and constitutional tradition are terms which just as vague as culture,
legal culture or constitutional culture. Articles and books use this notion as a general concept,
without ever defining its elements. The definition is missing in most cases; the reference to
constitutional traditions or constitutional culture is a reference to a positive value that the
Hungarian state and nation is assumed to have. Upholding this belief has been very important in
the rebuilding of proper statehood after certain historical periods.
According to the Hungarian language dictionary, tradition is ‘the habit, morality, taste, or
conception that has survived in a written or an unwritten form since ancient times and that is
passed on from generation to generation and remains actively applied.’59 In order to legitimize
different political regimes in Hungary, the reference to the legal continuity and the formal or
substantive legal continuity of the historical constitution has often played a significant role.
Constitutional development, understood as the enforcement of the rule or law, the protection of
fundamental rights by law or the separation of powers, was often the result of an external in-
fluence on the state, as Hungary was often dependent on, or cooperated with, other states in
questions of statehood. The constitutional standards, if not imposed, were often dependent on
alliances, external interests, cohabitation and coalitions. In the case of Central European
statehoods, it seems to be almost impossible to refer to individual constitutional traditions,
making it almost impossible to identify ‘typically Hungarian’ traditions.
The new Fundamental Law of Hungary chose to refer to the historical constitution, however,
as a constitutional tradition that amounts to a source of law which has existed for a long period
and continues to do so today.60 This approach to certain elements of the constitutional tradi-
tions, as part of the contemporary legal system, is very far from the legal positivist approach that
was typical of Hungarian law and jurisprudence, not only in the socialist regime which had a
longstanding effect on the legal thinking, but later as well.61 Therefore when the Constitutional
Court first referred to the historical constitution, it referred rather to certain concrete positive
norms (pieces of legislation of constitutional value) and classical principles that were in effect at
a certain time in history; the constitutional Court rarely referred to conventions or customary
59‘Tradition’ in the Dictionary of the Hungarian Language.
60Rixer (2013) 8.; A t€orteneti alkotmanyunk is jogforras! – Horvath Attila a Mandinernek. (2016). Forras: http://
mandiner.blog.hu/2016/12/15/a_torteneti_alkotmanyunk_is_jogforras_horvath_attila_a_mandinernek
61Jakab (2003).
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law which would rather have fit with the way the historical constitution was applied in the
past.62
The introduction of the German type constitutional complaint in the 2011 Fundamental Law
is a very interesting development in this regard. (The constitutional complaint was introduced to
replace the actio popularis with which, after 1989, anyone could turn to the Constitutional Court
by presenting a petition to ask for the abstract review of the constitutionality of a piece of
legislation.) The German type constitutional complaint was a substitute, and the two thirds
constitution-making majority emphasised that the judiciary should be obliged to interpret all
legislative acts according to the provisions of the Fundamental Law. The German type consti-
tutional complaint mechanism seemed to be a good tool to enforce this requirement and
therefore the requirement that the constitutional traditions be incorporated in the legal inter-
pretation. The problem is that when the interpretation of the Fundamental Law by the
Constitutional Court becomes uncertain, due to the compulsory methods of interpretation
prescribed by Article R) of the Fundamental Law (e.g. by taking into consideration and
respecting the achievements of the historical constitution), this uncertainty can influence the
ordinary judiciary as well.63
One problem is that the historical constitution is often described as being substantively
incompatible with the present democratic constitutional order, even in cases where the legal
continuity is emphasized in the political discourse.64 Although, for example, the two-chamber
Parliament is a centuries-old tradition in Hungary, and the building itself is constructed
accordingly, after the democratic transition of 1989, both constitution making majorities pre-
served the one chamber Parliament, which was a Communist construction. The constitutional
review is also regarded as a very important element of the present state operation; this only dates
back to 1990, and was preserved after 2012. Constitutional adjudication is now regarded as a
traditional element of the state structure, although such an institution never existed before 1990
in Hungary during the times of the historical constitution.
What is regarded as a constitutional tradition in Hungary according to the Fundamental
Law? Uncertainty is a problem that goes hand in hand with the hybrid concept of constitu-
tionalism. The heritage of the 1989 democratic transition is liberal constitutionalism based on
the limitation of government, the rule of law, the separation of powers and the protection of
human rights, while the achievements of the 1000-year-old historical constitution as it is
mentioned by the new Fundamental Law involve the Holy Crown and Christianity and the
traditional values of marriage, work and family, etc. The Fundamental Law is explicitly adopted
on the basis of the 1989 amendment of the 1949 Constitution (Act XX of 1949 on the
Constitution) that codified the democratic transition,65 while it departs from that document
mostly by defining a different order of values, reaching far back to former national and
constitutional traditions as an element of the new order of values. Due to the uncertainty of
62Szakaly (2015) 24–38. And see an almost complete collection of the Constitutional Court references to the historical
constitution in Rixer (2018).
63Gardos-Orosz (2019).
64Szente (2019) 18.
65Point 2 of the Closing Provisions of the Fundamental Law.
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these former traditions, however, there is an uncertainty in the present content of constitu-
tionality if it is linked to these former uncertain traditions.66
The destruction of liberal democracy after 2010 relied on the political assumption of the
constitution making majority that Hungary has strong former constitutional traditions that date
back before – indeed far before – the Second World War.67 Although the constitutional
structure of the state remained quite similar in the Fundamental Law to those of the 1989
Constitution, and the institutions, form of government and rights are almost the same, the
constitutional principles and values became different after the nine amendments to the
Fundamental Law. We might also say that the chosen constitutional tradition that the Hun-
garian populist constitutionalism wishes to adopt switched from liberal constitutionalism to
national traditionalism within the framework of constitutional democracy. This latter is un-
doubtedly linked to European constitutional values, but these traditions are not necessarily the
exact same as today are represented by the European Council or the European Union.
I will explain in the following that in some cases the so-called constitutional tradition is a
contemporary normative creation of the new political elite designed to strengthen the legitimacy
of the current government, rather than legal rules and principles which could be or should be
applicable straightforwardly in a contemporary legal order based on a written constitution. This
is, therefore, not a rule of law legitimacy in a strict sense, meaning that it is not developed by the
autonomous legal subsystem itself; in other words, it is not the successful survival of those
constitutional norms which are alive and have been enforced over political regimes, generations
and even centuries. The contemporary state institutions are empowered by the Fundamental
Law to define the content of past constitutional history.
3.1. The achievement of the historical constitution as a means to define the
constitutional traditions after 2012
In the text of the Fundamental Law, the constitutional traditions, namely the historical
constitution, were mentioned as a ground for Hungarian statehood, in addition to the 1989
democratic transition. Some scholars trace the roots of the historical constitution to the state’s
foundation in 1,000, or earlier, before the conquest in the late 9th century (which was a
dominant view among Hungarian legal historians before WWII).68
This provision in the Fundamental Law was first regarded by experts as an ideological
element in the constitution with little or no legal normative value, but after a while the
Constitutional Court tried to define the meaning of the following provisions in the Fundamental
Law: In the National Avowal: ‘We honour the achievements of our historic constitution and we
honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood
and the unity of the nation. We do not recognise the suspension of our historic constitution due
to foreign occupations.’ Article R (3): ‘The provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be
66As the legal historian Ferenc Eckhart wrote, many articles of the Golden Bull were already invalid a hundred years after
its adoption. Eckhart (1932) 316. The most famous article 31 of the Bull, which contained the ius resistendi of the
noblemen, was abolished in 1,687.
67This idea was implemented into the text of the Fundamental Law. Varga (2016) 83–89.
68Zetenyi (2010).
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interpreted in accordance with their purposes, the National Avowal contained therein and the
achievements of our historic constitution.’
To give a normative content to these sentences in the Fundamental Law was a dubious
constitutional exercise, since for constitutionalists socialised after 1990 it was completely foreign
to merge the – at its roots medieval – concept of the historical constitution with the most recent
written constitution in Europe, the adoption of which is based on the 1989 democratic
Constitution of the transition. As far as it is interpreted simply as a prescription to use historical
interpretation as one of the methods of interpretation (which is used by the Hungarian
Constitutional Court anyway), these provisions do not amount to a great challenge to consti-
tutional adjudication.69 On the other hand, if it means something more than this, it might be a
new concept of hybrid constitutionalism, of which the contours are not yet clear.70 The reference
found in Article R) to the achievements of the historical constitution could equally be under-
stood as a test.71 As I emphasized above, it is up to the contemporary state institutions to decide
for one or the other interpretation. The dilemma is still not fully settled in 2020.
The Constitutional Court’s web page lists 79 decisions between 2012 and mid-2020 that
mention the historical constitution’s achievements, either as part of Art. R) or alone. The 76
mentions are related to the merits of decisions made. There were 92 mentions altogether in the
majority-, concurring and dissenting opinions, and some of these mentioned the National
Avowal. Although referred to as Art R) or to the historical constitution, some did not contain
any related argumentation. Only 30 cases used the achievements of the historical constitution as
part of the argumentation. According to Gera, 22 principles were found to be the achievement of
the historical constitution along with seven concrete rules.72
A popular Act is the Act 1946. evi I. of the Constitution, which is an essential piece of our
legal history although it never entered into force;73 there were also specific mentions of such
concrete rules as the provisions of the Act 1911. evi I. tc. According to legal historians, this state
treasury rule was not important as an element of the historical constitution in 1911. Examples of
the legal principles could be equality,74 or the need to preserve forests,75 or maternity benefit.76
In some cases, the Constitutional Court referred to the historical constitution without
explaining the place of this reference in the argumentation.77 In other cases, we read a related
historical description without any identification of the historical constitution’s achievements78.
69Adam Rixer identifies four approaches in the interpretation of the Fundamental Law. One is the rejecting, one is the
learning, one is the applying and one is the cenetring position. Rixer (2018) 107–17.
70Schweitzer Gabor explains the absurdity of this hybridity while Andras Varga Zs. finds it a progressive legal solution to
connect the past, the present and the future to strengthen constitutionalism.
71Rixer (2018).
72Gera (n. a.).
73CC decision 16/2016. (X. 20.).
74CC decision 85 22/2016. (XII. 5.).
75CC decision 14/2020. (VII. 6.).
76CC decision 3023/2016 (XI. 18.).
77CC decision 45/2012. (XII. 29.); CC decision 5/2013. (II. 21.).
78CC decision 4/2013. (II. 21.); CC decision 6/2013. (III. 1.).
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Gera proves that there were only 5 cases in which the Constitutional Court conducted a
thorough historical analysis before recognizing the achievement.79
In most cases, the historical constitution’s identified achievements, such as press freedom,
are entirely in line with the content of the Fundamental Law.80 This was the general approach in
those approximately 3 cases per year in which the achievement of the historical constitution was
identified. In a few cases, the range of the achievement was debated. In decision 34/2017. (XII.
11.) AB hat., the press legislation of 1848 was identified and referred to by the majority opinion.
In her dissenting opinion, one judge claimed that if it had respected the real content of this 1848
act, the Constitutional Court must have concluded differently in its opinion.
The Constitutional Court agreed that a decision could not be based solely on the achieve-
ments of the historical constitution without finding legal bases in the Fundamental Law.
However, the real weight of the reference depends on the specific case. The reference to the
historical constitution is always an additional argument.81 In this case, however, the question
arises of its role and the legitimacy, and the necessity of a reference to it. The dissenting opinion
of another judge to point 22/2019. (VII. 26.) focuses on this question by saying that it is hard to
recognise the relevance of this provision in domestic constitutional law. This decision consid-
ered that our sovereign statehood was an achievement of the historical constitution. The
dissenting opinion says that the historical constitution’s achievements have their meaning only
concerning the EU and the international legal order and the independent place of Hungary and
Hungarian constitutionalism. Therefore it should be applied against external legal norms.
Already in 2012, right after the entering into force of the Fundamental Law, the Constitu-
tional Court explained the importance of historical arguments, claiming that without this
knowledge ‘our present-day public law and our legal culture in general would be rootless’.82 In
the first years of the application of the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court sometimes
used merely formal statements, stressing that the body ‘took it into account’ that certain rights
have historical roots embedded in the historical constitution; the freedom of the press, for
example, was an achievement of the historical constitution established by the Act XVIII of
1848.83 The redundant arguments often appeared in this period, when the old value is the same
as the content of the Fundamental Law; in this case the freedom of the press is fully present in
the Fundamental Law of 2011 and specified by the media laws adopted in 2010.84
On the other hand, in this specific example the achievements of the historical constitution
are also contradictory in that, for example, the act of 1848 was a huge step forward in the 19th
century towards the freedom of the press, but would be a huge step backwards today in its
protection. Szente points out that it is a good example that points to a general problem of the
nature of the myths of the constitutional development. Pieces of past legislation, even those with
a positive constitutional value with regard to the extension of rights could not be applied
literally; they require further contemporary interpretation which is an interdisciplinary project
79Gera (n. a.)
80E.g. CC decision 28/2014. (IX. 29.).
81CC decision 25/2018. (XIII. 28.); CC decision 22/2019. (VII. 5.); Gera (n. a.); CC decision 3001/2019. (I. 7.).
82CC decision 33/2012. (VII. 17.).
83CC decision 28/2014. (IX. 29.) and 3002/2018. (I. 10.).
84See the Laws CIV and CLXXXV of 2010.
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involving history and law, otherwise the legal interpretation is arbitrary. Another good example
is that the Constitutional Court referred several times, for example, to the guarantees of judicial
independence as an achievement of the historical constitution as if the legal source of these
guarantees in Hungarian law were Act IV on the exercise of judicial power of 1869, rather than
the current constitution and the Cardinal Act CLXII of 2011 on the legal status and remu-
neration of judges. Although judicial independence is undoubtedly a stable value of the classical
liberal development, it had a different content than is required today.85
These references to the legal sources of the past as the sources of contemporary law are also
problematic for contentious reasons. The old provisions serve rather as principles than as rules,
but this distinction is not clear from the text. In the case of a contentious difference, i.e. a
contradiction between the meaning of the old and the new text, doctrinally it could be also
possible to reduce the level of protection with reference to the achievement of the historical
constitution, which is certainly not a goal in a European legal order.
The interdisciplinary nature of the project causes difficulties in Constitutional Court prac-
tice. Decision 16/2016. (X. 20.), for example, refers to the Preamble to Act I of 1946 (Small
Constitution) as an achievement of the historical constitution, despite the fact that this law
deliberately interrupted the continuity with the ancient historical constitution in all its essential
elements, such as the form of government, the issue of sovereignty, or the structure of legislative
power.86 Carrying this line of interpretation further, Laszlo Solyom, the first president of the
Constitutional Court from 1990 to 1999, and later president of the Republic, stated that he
would interpret the above mentioned provisions of the Fundamental Law to imply that the
constitutional developments from 1989 to 2010, the legislation, constitutional jurisprudence etc.
are also part of the historical constitution.87 These are interpretations that break with the
concept of the historical constitution as understood in Hungarian legal history and try to
interpret it freely to preserve the achievements of Act 1 of 1946, the first written constitution
that eventually did not enters into force after World War II, and the 1989 liberal democratic
constitutionalism.
There are a number of examples in which the CC finds a related rule in previous law and
uses it as an achievement of the historical constitution, although not all legal provisions adopted
before 1944 were included in the conceptual framework of the historical constitution, only those
‘basic’ or ‘cardinal’ laws that concerned the exercise of public power or individual rights and
freedoms.88
Andras Varga Zs., a constitutional judge, in one of his concurring opinions referred to the
Golden Bull (Aranybulla) of 1222 as an achievement of the historical constitution and therefore
a source of the present constitutional provisions in connection with the protection of human
rights and limited government. He also referred to the respect for ‘public law autonomies’ as a
legal source of law in connection with so-called Tripartitum of 1517, to the freedom of religion
in connection with the laws of Torda in 1568, the requirement of the lawful exercise of public
power with reference to the so-called Pragmatica Sanctio of 1723, to parliamentary government
85Szente (2019) 18.
86See the above examples and more, in Szente (2011).
87Reference to an interview with Laszlo Solyom in Szakaly (2015).
88See this opinion and further examples in Hungarian, Szente (2019).
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and equality before the law in relation to the revolutionary laws of 1848, and the principle of the
division of power, the recognition of judicial independence and the protection of national
minorities linked to the laws of 1867 on the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.89
According to Szente, legal historian and constitutionalist, these are undoubtedly important
points in legal history. Legal history books thoroughly analyse these elements of the develop-
ment of law in these periods, but Szente calls our attention to the trivial fact that we have written
rules in the positive legal order currently in force in Hungary for the same constitutional is-
sues.90 Therefore the reference to these old texts in these cases is redundant, and therefore
unnecessary in a legal sense.
Peter Paczolay, who was the head of the Constitutional Court when the new Fundamental Law
was born, wrote about the impossibility of the concept of the contemporary historical constitution,
a written constitution that takes into account the historical constitution as the source of law.91
The living constitutional tradition’s approach is rather to find the law in contemporary
positive legal sources, – i.e. in domestic, international and European law and jurisprudence –
and apply the historical interpretation as a method of interpretation in order to understand
better the piece of legislation. In many cases the Constitutional Court uses a historical inter-
pretation in essence, although referring to Art. R) of the Fundamental Law and the achievements
of the historical constitution.92 A methodological problem is that the classical method, or the
historical interpretation, is transformed in many cases in the jurisprudence, in order to comply
with the Fundamental Law, to a kind of a test to find the relevant achievement of the historical
constitution. The procedure is the same in constitutional interpretation but it is referred to
differently – instead of the historical interpretation as Jellinek puts it, is a so called ‘achievement
test’. The goal of both interpretative activities is to find the relevant legal norms of principles in
the past and look into them whenever they can help the judge in defining the current content of
the constitutional provision in cases of doubt or uncertainty. In legal interpretation, given that
the law is a social subsystem, the past, present and the future are fused together, and it is natural
to look to the past for advice for the future. But the normative power of this past over the present
is in question. In a case in which the past acquires a normative power in present constitu-
tionalism, but it is not clear what the past exactly is, where it depends on the state institutions in
a situation when the state institutions are captured by the two thirds political majority repre-
senting some or the majority of the people, this leads to a controlled understanding of the past
and a controlled understanding of past rules and values. This, in turn, leads to the rule of the
people in a position of power, rather than the rule of law – i.e. control by the political power.
This results in the problem of uncertainty, a lack of the rule of law and arbitrariness.
As to problem of discrepancy, we must recognise that many of the constitutional traditions
we had during the times of the historical constitution are very far from the present-day
conception of constitutionalism. Szente points out in his criticism that many important in-
stitutions of the Fundamental Law ‒ such as the Republican form of government, the office of
the President of the Republic, the neutrality of the state, the institution of the Constitutional




18 Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 06/16/21 01:16 PM UTC
Court, or the sovereignty transfer within the framework of European Union membership ‒ are
fully incompatible with the value order and the system of public powers and fundamental rights
under the historical constitution. This is especially true for one central element of the historical
constitution, the Holy Crown.93
Apart from a very small number of principles and institutions, the content of the historical
constitution has been constantly changing over time;94 for example, the Golden Bull and the
Pragmatica Sanctio have never both been in force in Hungary at the same time, while the
revolutionary laws of 1848 radically changed the substantial content of the former feudal law.
According to Szente, most components of the historical constitution never existed in the country
at the same time.95
It hardly needs to be said how difficult it is to determine the precise meaning of the laws of past
times ages and their present-day relevance.96 In our case, if the relevance cannot be justified with
the real necessity of the reference from a legal point of view,97 another explanation is needed. This
explanation is triggered by the fact that the Fundamental Law should have its own convincing
force to create the constitutional statehood itself, which is supported by the people. A possible
reason for this normative reference of the historical constitution is that the constitution making
and constitution amending two thirds authority wished to carve its legitimacy into the past, to
carve it in stone. Populist policy makers desired to create a nation that supports its constitutional
politics by this reference to the common and valuable historical past, to continuity, to the
achievements of the historical constitution, as the basis of the strong state. The enforcement of the
people’s, or the nation’s, common values created by the constitution making two thirds majority
and therefore the strengthening of the community of the people that elects its populist leadership,
can be qualified as an element of the national populist constitutionalism in Hungary.
The normative interpretation of the people as a common, united nation was further
implemented in the form of the constitutional identity.
Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) of the Constitutional Court, according to which Hungary’s
constitutional identity is based on the historical constitution, says that the Court itself will
elaborate on the precise content of constitutional identity ‘in accordance with the historical
constitution, from case to case’. In doing so, the Court wishes to examine whether the joint
exercise of competences with the EU institutions does not violate Hungary’s constitutional
identity as it is based on the historical constitution.98
3.2. Constitutional traditions as elements of the constitutional identity – A new
phenomenon after 2016
The legal notion of constitutional identity was born in Hungary in the political context of the





97Drinoczi, Chronowski and Kocsis (2012) 41–64.
98Szente and Gardos-Orosz (2018) 99.
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towards the EU and towards the nation.99 The elements of the proposed national identity are
constitutionalised in the form of the constitutional identity, because – as I described above in the
definition of constitutional populism – in Hungary due to the political landscape, the new
approach of the populist parties, and especially Fidesz, can very rapidly become part of the
constitutional system.100
The Hungarian Constitutional Court referred to the section on identity of the Treaty of the
European Union, and also referred to many other European constitutional court decisions that
formed the concept of national and constitutional identity. The Hungarian national or consti-
tutional identity was expressed in a defence against EU law. Apart from this normative attempt
to refer to the national constitutional particularities against EU law, constitutional identity and
the constitution itself certainly plays a role in the establishment of the people as the source of
legitimacy.101
Attempts have been made to spread the new values, partly advertised as national traditions in
society: all high school graduates e.g. get an attractive copy of the Fundamental Law. The po-
litical idea is well formulated in the concurring opinion of judge Andras Zs. Varga in Decision
2262016 (XII. 5.) of the Constitutional Court: ‘Constitutional self-identity is not a universal legal
value, it is a feature of specific States and of their communities, of the nation, that does not apply
(the same way) to other nations. In the case of Hungary, national identity is in particular
inseparable from constitutional identity. The constitutional governance of the country has been
one of the core values the nation has always stuck to, and that has been a living value even at the
times when the whole or the majority of the country was occupied by foreign powers.’
In the national Avowal we read the following ‘We hold that the protection of our identity
rooted in our historic constitution is a fundamental obligation of the State. We do not recognise
the suspension of our historic constitution due to foreign occupations.’ Article R) (4) states that
‘The protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an
obligation of every organ of the State’.
The constitutional identity of Hungary is defined as making reservations primarily in op-
position to EU law, which is why it is important to strongly link this with the historical
constitution in the argumentation instead of basing it on common European constitutional
values. Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) of the Constitutional Court was agreed after an unsuccessful
amendment to the Fundamental Law to make reservation with reference to Hungarian identity
to EU law in the migration crisis in the absence of a two thirds Government majority in
Parliament, and after an invalid referendum on the same issue.102
Finally, in Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.), the Constitutional Court decided on the interpretation
of the Fundamental Law in favour of the Government’s goals. The procedure of interpretation
had been requested from the Court by the ombudsman. As explained in the motion, the con-
crete constitutional issue was related to the European Union’s Council Decision (EU) 2015/
1,601 of 22 September 2015 on migration.103
99Drinoczi (2017).
100Rixer (2012).
101Sulyok and Deli (2019).
102Halmai (2018).
103Orban (2018).
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The CC established that the EU provides adequate protection for fundamental rights. The
Constitutional Court, however, cannot set aside the protection of fundamental rights either, and
it must grant that the joint exercise of competences would not result in the violation of human
dignity or the essential content of other fundamental rights the protection is which is part of the
constitutional identity.
The Court set two main limitations in the context of the question on the legal acts of the
Union that extend beyond the jointly exercised competences. Firstly, the joint exercise of a
competence shall not violate Hungary’s sovereignty; secondly, it shall not lead to the violation of
its constitutional identity. The CC emphasized that the protection of constitutional identity
should take the form of a constitutional dialogue based on the principles of equality and colle-
giality of the partners to the dialogue, implemented with each other’s mutual respect. The
Constitutional Court established its competence for the examination of whether the joint exercise
of powers by way of the institutions of the EU would violate human dignity, another fundamental
right, the sovereignty of Hungary or its identity based on the country’s historical constitution.104
The curiosity of the case is that this is the first time that the CC has ruled explicitly on the
relation between EU law and the domestic constitution, claiming that the Fundamental Law has
ultimate supremacy in fundamental constitutional questions. Furthermore, the constitutional
identity, the inviolable core of the constitution has never previously been defined as such. The
country’s historical constitution as an element of the non-amendable identity also poses new
questions in the Hungarian constitutional order. If the Fundamental Law is amendable up to the
point it does not interfere with the historical constitution as a basis, the historical constitution so
far undefined in the positive constitutional law might, in effect, have a new, stronger position, at
least as a tool of the constitutional interpretation.
The Constitutional Court established in Section III.7.2. of its reasoning that ‘the constitu-
tional self-identity of Hungary is a fundamental value not created by the Fundamental Law – it is
merely acknowledged by the Fundamental Law. Consequently, constitutional identity cannot be
waived by way of an international treaty – Hungary can only be deprived of its constitutional
identity through the final termination of its sovereignty, independent statehood. Therefore, the
protection of constitutional identity shall remain the duty of the Constitutional Court as long as
Hungary is a sovereign State.’105
Constitutional traditions, whatever they be, according to the above mentioned legal facts are
part of the Hungarian constitutional order. Some scholars could easily list the constitutional
traditions of Hungary and would trace them back far into history.106 Some Hungarian scholars
in 2020 would argue that the present constitutional order is ‘past dependent’, i.e. the elements of
the historical constitution are legal facts and sources of law and therefore unchangeable by any
new constitution-making political power. Constitutional traditions, as achievements of the
historical constitution are the basis of the Hungarian constitutional identity that is inviolable by
any domestic or foreign powers.107 I tend to be more convinced, however, by those who say – as
104See our analysis also Bodnar, Gardos-Orosz and Pozsar-Szentmiklosy (2017) 77–81.
105Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) Reasoning [67]
106Zetenyi (2010).
107A t€orteneti alkotmanyunk is jogforras! – Horvath Attila a Mandinernek. (Our historical constitution is also a source of
law! – Attila Horvath to Mandiner) (2016).
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I argued above – that the constitutional traditions, especially in the form of the achievements of the
historical constitution can hardly be understood as an additional normative element to the written
constitution, to the Fundamental Law. To understand the achievements of the historical consti-
tution as a new source of law that plays a doctrinal role in the interpretation of the Fundamental
Law as a test is a troubled concept, because it creates a hybrid constitution, the normative elements
of which are unclear and therefore could not be consciously consented to by the constitution
making and constitution amending power. On the other hand, these sentences could be understood
only as ornaments to the constitutional text (the redundancy argument in the legal sense) and to
the ratio decidendi in constitutional court decisions, or, alternatively, it could be argued that the
reference to the elements of the historical constitution is not much more than the classical historical
method of interpretation. Other legal functions than these are difficult to recognise.
Furthermore, tradition and identity suppose a sort of stability and continuity in the consti-
tutional order. The problem is that this continuity is created as an artificial attempt by the
constitution making power in order to strengthen its legitimacy with reference to a united nation,
a cultural nation instead of a plural and diverse polity. A tool, a ‘quick fix’ could be populist
constitutionalism, to adopt the new ideas in the form of the constitution and the constitutional
law. This is very easy in Hungary, because the Government has a two thirds constitution making
majority in the Parliament; furthermore Hungary has a very flexible, easily amendable consti-
tution. The populist’s constitutionalism becomes populist constitutionalism in a minute, by
constitution making and constitutional amendment; legislation is a quick fix of the political
agenda, which identifies itself as illiberal, but which fits into many scholarly descriptions of the
national populist regime. Our concern is that the establishment of the achievements of the
historical constitution as a source of law in Hungary, the constitutional identity, all the created
attributes of the imagined united nation, and the common people-common traditions myth that
appear to be political promises made by monolithic public power to society, have been incor-
porated into the constitutional system without recognisable legal function.
4. CONCLUSION
My efforts here have been to analyse the place of constitutional traditions in the constitutional
systemof a populist state using a legalmethodology, i.e. just onemore piece to be added to thewhole
issue of populist constitutionalism, which is basically rather about the process of identity creation,
political ideology and communication. With an interdisciplinary approach we could certainly
create a more accurate depiction of the entirety of populist constitutionalism, and its rhetorical
strategies, because it is not about the legal texts alone but their creation and the ‘communication
noise’ that surrounds this creation. In this papermy goal has been to prove that by introducing such
terminology to the legal system without any legal function, the scrutiny of law fades away and the
system is transformed into a political vehicle for some sort of identity creation. This is problematic
because legal texts must have a recognisable legal meaning and function in a rule of law democracy.
Robert Cover, the American legal theorist, argues that legal texts are surrounded by a rich
narrative universe (Nomos), the different stories of identity and meaning.108 As Michel Rose-
nfeld writes in one of his books, the creation of constitutional identity is based on a kind of
108Cover (1982).
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selection from these various identities.109 This selection clearly appears in the Fundamental Law
of Hungary. The question is, however, whether the Nomos is the result of an organic consti-
tutional development with the participation of all state institutions and society, or an imposed
and sudden political idea to be enforced in society via the state institutions and law. The creation
of the narrative – the identity process – is by nature an autonomous one, if it is to be sustainable
and reproduceable in the long run. My paper has proved that in the case of national populist
constitutionalism, the understanding of the constitutional traditions in the creation of the
constitutional identity and in the interpretation of the other elements of law is not the result of
an autonomous constitutional development.
I used the following arguments to provide evidence for the arbitrariness of the introduction
of the compulsory nature of the observance as a source of law of the undefined concept of
constitutional traditions.
 This summary is based on the suggestions of the anonymous reviewer.
 The problem of ‘contradiction’: There are many institutions in the present Hungarian
constitutional order that are contrary to historical traditions (e.g. the one-chamber Parlia-
ment, constitutional adjudication, a republican form of government, the neutrality of the
state, the doctrine of the Holy Crown etc.
 The problem of ‘redundancy’: It is not necessary to refer to the historical constitution if the
same regulation exists in the present legal system, in the Fundamental Law. See e.g. the ex-
amples concerning the freedom of the press, but it is also true e.g. in relation to the Golden
Bull, the Tripartitum, and the Pragmatica Sanctio, the values of which are there anyway in the
present legal order.
 The problem of ‘incoherence’: The ‘meaning’ of the historical constitution is vague because
the historical tradition itself is incoherent. There seem to be many different – often contra-
dictory – approaches to the same issue in Hungarian legal history.
 The problem of ‘definition’: as I have shown, in some cases it is the rule and in some cases it is
the principle that applies. As the content of the historical constitution changed from time to
time, it is not possible to list a set of norms that is regarded as the historical constitutional in
the past, so the Hungarian Constitutional Court refers to certain old pieces of legislation from
history if it sees fit, and in other times it is the principle which is regarded as part of the
present legal order by its historical force.
Since there are many problems associated with the idea of the historic constitution ‘from a
legal point of view’, there is no good legal reason for its introduction to the Fundamental Law.
Consequently, there must be an ‘external’, i.e. non legal reason, for this, which is related to
constitutional populism: the reference to the constitutional tradition and historic constitution is
a ‘quick fix’ in order to increase the legitimacy of the new constitution and declare a common
constitutional heritage of the united nation.
Paul Blokker talked about ‘false promises and quick fixes’ as one important characteristic of
populist regimes. The Hungarian political agenda clearly identifies that the strength of the
nation, welfare and peaceful life depends on common values.110 These common values are
109Rosenfeld (2009).
110Bartha, Boda and Szikra (2020).
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created by the constitution and by the laws. In Hungary the concept of the nation’s common
constitutional heritage is not only part of the populist rhetoric, but also of the populist
constitutional order, because the populist party is in a position to create and alter the consti-
tution and the legal order on its own. This is what we call constitutional populism, the expe-
rience of which is very vivid in Hungary. Hungary was and is a litmus paper to study populist
constitutionalism.
I have explained in this study that populist constitutionalism operates with the concept of
constitutional traditions, which appear in Hungary in the form of the reference to the
achievements of the historical constitution. Hungary is special case, because this reference also
appears as a compulsory rule of interpretation of the constitutional text and, according to certain
interpretations, it leads towards the creation of a hybrid constitution, a written constitution with
additional and uncertain elements embedded in the concept of the achievements of the historical
constitution.
In the greater context of globalisation and European integration the populist regimes’
rediscovery of the concept of sovereignty, constitutional identity and the particular constitu-
tional tradition as part of these, is basically a diplomatic way of saying ‘we do within our border
whatever we want’. As Pietro Faraguna argues, there are two ways this argument can be used:
one is the ‘sword’ which is used to halt any deeper integration process of the European Union,
and the other is the ‘shield’ where the goal is to head the European discussion in a more
appealing direction.111 The issue could be further examined in this direction.
LITERATURE
Ablonczy B., Az alkotmany nyomaban. Beszelgetesek Szajer Jozseffel es Gulyas Gegellyel (In the wake of the
Fundmental Law: discussions with Jozsef Szajer and Gergely Gulyas) (Elektromedia Kft. 2011).
Albert, R., ‘Constitutional Handcuffs’ (2017) 1 Intergenerational Justice Review 18-31.
Anselmi, M., Populism: An Introduction (Routledge 2018) 1–130.
Arter, D.: Inside the radical right: The development of anti-immigration parties in Western Europe (Cam-
bridge University Press 2011).
Balaguer Callejon, F., ‘Interpretacion constitucional y populismo’ (2020) 33 Revista de Derecho Con-
stitucional Europeo.
Balaguer Callejon, F., ‘Constitutional Interpretation and Populism in Contemporary Spain’ in Gardos-
Orosz, F. and Szente, Z. (eds.), Populist challenge to constitutional interpretation in Europe (Routledge
2021) 217–32.
Bartha, A., Boda, Zs. and Szikra, D., ‘When Populist Leaders Govern: Conceptualising Populism in Policy
Making’ (2020) 3 Politics and Governance 71–81.
Bankuti, M., Halmai, G. and Scheppele, K. L., ‘Disabling the Constitution’ (2012a) 3 23 Journal of De-
mocracy 138–46.
Bankuti, M., Halmai, G. and Scheppele, K. L., ‘From Separation of Powers to a Government without
Checks: Hungary’s Old and New Constitutions’ in Toth, G. A. (ed.), Constitution for a Disunited
Nation. On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law (CEU Press 2012b) 237–68.
111Faraguna (2019).
24 Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 06/16/21 01:16 PM UTC
Batt, J., ‘American Legal Populism: A Jurisprudential and Historical Narrative, Including Reflections on
Critical Legal Studies’ (1995) 22 Northern Kentucky Law Review 651–762.
Blokker, P., New Democracies in Crisis? A Comparative Constitutional Study of the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Routledge 2013).
Blokker, P., ‘Populism As a Constitutional Project’ (2019) 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law
536–53.
Blokker, P., ‘Populist constitutionalism’ in Carlos de la Torre (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Global Populism
(Routledge 2017) 113–27.
Bodnar, E., Gardos-Orosz, F. and Pozsar-Szentmiklosy, Z., ‘Developments in Hungarian Constitutional
Law’ in Albert, R., Landau, D., Faraguna, P. and Drugda, S. (eds.), 2016 Global Review of Constitutional
Law ICONnect-Clough Center (2017) 77–81.
Bugaric, B., ‘The two faces of populism, between authoritarian and democratic populism’ (2019) 20
German Law Journal 390–400.
Cover, R. M., ‘The Supreme Court 1982 Term. Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’ (1982) 97 Harvard Law
Review 4–68.
Drinoczi, T., ‘A 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB hatarozat: mit (nem) tartalmaz, es mi k€ovetkezik bel}ole. Az identi-
tasvizsgalat es az ultra vires k€oz€os hatask€orgyakorlas €osszehasonlıto elemzesben’ (Decision 22/2016
(XII. 5.) of the Constitutional Court: what it [does not] contains and what follows from it. Identity
testing and ultra vires shared competence in comparative analysis) (2017) 1 MTA Law Working Papers
<http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp> accessed 10 August 2020.
Drinoczi, T. and Bien-Kacała, A., ‘Illiberal Constitutionalism: The Case of Hungary and Poland’ (2019) 20
German Law Journal 1140–66.
Drinoczi, T., Chronowski, N. and Kocsis, M., ‘What Questions of Interpretation may be Raised by
the New Hungarian Constitution?’ (2012) 1 Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, 41-
64.
Drinoczi, T., Gardos-Orosz, F. and Pozsar-Szentmiklosy, Z., ‘Formal and informal constitutional amend-
ments in Hungary’ (2019) 18 MTA LAW Working Papers <https://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp/formal-and-
informal-constitutional-amendment-in-hungary> accessed 10 August 2020.
Eatwell, R. and Goodwin, M., National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy (Pelican 2018).
Eckhart, F., ‘Jog es alkotmanyt€ortenet’ (Law and constitutional history) in Homan, B. (ed.), A magyar
t€ortenetıras uj utjai (Magyar Szemle Tarsasag 1932) 267–320.
Faraguna, P., ‘Constitutional Identity in the EU – A Shield or a Sword?’ (2019) 18 German Law Journal
1617–40.
Fitzi, G., Mackert, J. and Turner, B. S., Populism and the Crisis of Democracy. Volume 1: Concepts and
Theory (Routledge 2018).
Gardos-Orosz, F., ‘Constitutional interpretation under the new Fundamental Law of Hungary’ in Gardos-
Orosz, F. and Szente, Z., Populist Challenges to Constitutional Interpretation in Europe and Beyond
(Routledge 2021) 143–59.
Gardos-Orosz, F., ‘Challenges to Constitutional Adjudication in Hungary after 2010’ in Belov, M. (ed.), The
Role of Courts in Contemporary Legal Orders (Eleven Interntional Publishing 2019) 321–40.
Gera, A., ‘T€orteneti alkotmanyunk vıvmanyai az Alapt€orveny specialis alkotmanyos rendszereben’ (The
Historical Constitution in the Fundamental Law) (2021) 6 MTA Law Working Papers <https://jog.tk.
hu/mtalwp/torteneti-alkotmanyunk-vivmanyai-az-alaptorveny-specialis-alkotmanyos-rendszereben>
accessed on 10 April 2021.
Ginsburg, T. and Huq, A. Z., How to Save Constitutional Democracy? (University of Chicago Press 2019).
Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 25
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 06/16/21 01:16 PM UTC
Graber, M. A., ‘Born Populist: The Trump Administration, the Courts and the Constitution of the United
States’ in Gardos-Orosz, F. and Szente, Z. (eds), Populist Challenges to Constitutional Interpretation in
Europe and Beyond (Routledge 2021) 253–73.
Halmai, G., ‘Abuse of Constitutional Identity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court on Interpretation of
Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law’ (2018) 43 Review of Central and East European Law 23–42.
Halmai, G., ‘Dismantling Constitutional Review in Hungary’ (2019a) 18 Rivista de diritti comparati 31–47.
Halmai, Gabor. ‘Populism, Authoritarianism and Constitutionalism’ (2019b) 20 German Law Journal 296–
313.
Jakab, A., ‘A szocializmus dogmatikai hagyateka’ (‘The dogmatic legacy of socialism’) (2003) 4 Jogelmeleti
Szemle <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/jakab15.html> accessed 10 August 2020.
Kovacs, K. and Toth, G. A., ‘Hungary’s Constitutional Transformation’ (2011) 16 7 European Constitu-
tional Law Review 183–203.
Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A., Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After Cold War (Cambridge
University Press 2010) 1–536.
Corrias, L., ‘Populism in a Constitutional Key: Constituent Power, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional
Identity’ (2016) 12 European Constitutional Law Review 6–26.
Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, C. R., Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2017).
Landau, D., ‘Populist Constitutions’ (2018) 85 University of Chicago Law Review 521–43.
M€uller, J-W., ‘Populism and Constitutionalism’ in Kaltwasser, C. R. et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of
Populism (Oxford University Press 2018) 590–606.
M€uller, J.-W.: What is populism? (University of Pensylvania Press 2013) 1–136.
Molnar, B., Nemeth, M. and Toth, P. (eds),Merlegen az Alapt€orveny, Interjuk€otet hazank uj alkotmanyarol,
(The Fundamental Law on the balance sheet, interviews about the new constitution of our country)
(Hvg-Orac 2013) 1–224.
Orban, E., ‘Quo vadis, “alkotmanyos identitas”?’ (Quo vadis, “constitutional identity”?’) (2018) 3 K€ozjogi
Szemle 1–13.
Pogany, I., ‘The Crisis of Democracy in East Central Europe: The “New Constitutionalism”’ (2013) 19
European Public Law 341–67.
Paczolay, P., ‘A t€orteneti alkotmany es a konzervatıv jogi gondolkodas’ (The historical constitution and
conservative legal thinking) in T}okeczki, L. (ed), Magyar Konzervatizmus. Hagyomany es Jelenkor
(Batthyany Lajos Alapıtvany 1994) 29–36.
Ranchordas, S. and Roznai, Y. (ed), Time, Law and Change: an interdisciplinary study. (Hart Publishing
2020) 1–408.
Rixer, A., A vıvmany-teszt (The achievement-test) (Ludovika Egyetemi Kiado 2018) 1–155.
Rixer, A., Features of the Hungarian Legal System after 2010 (Patrocinium Kft.2012) 1–174.
Rixer, A., ‘Hungary’s Fundamental Law and the concept of the historical constitution’ (2013) 4 European
Journal of European History of Law 116–23.
Rosenfeld, M., The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship and Community (Routledge
2009) 344.
Scheppele, K. L.: ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 85 University of Chicago Law Review 545–583.
Sulyok, T. and Deli, G., ‘A magyar nemzeti identitas az Alkotmanybırosag gyakorlataban’ (The Hungarian
national identity in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court) (2019) 1 Alkotmanybırosagi Szemle.
Schweitzer, G., A magyar kiralyi k€oztarsasagtol a magyar k€oztarsasagig (From the Hungarian Royal Re-
public to the Hungarian Republic) (Publikon Kiado 2017) 153.
26 Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 06/16/21 01:16 PM UTC
Schweitzer, G., ‘K€ozjogi provizorium, jogfolytonossag, uj k€ozjogi irany – Az 1919/1920–1944 k€oz€otti
magyarorszagi alkotmanyjog-tudomany vazlata, II. resz’ (Temporary legal order, Legal continuity, the
new direction in public law - Sketch on the Hungarian public legal science between 1919-1944, Part II.)
(2014) 2 K€ozjogi Szemle 8–17.
Sonnevend, P., Jakab, A. and Csink, L., ‘The constitution as an instrument of everyday party politics: the
basic law of Hungary: The Basic Law of Hungary’ in von Bogdandy, A. and Sonnevend, P. (eds),
Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area. Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and
Romania (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG 2015) 46–123.
Solyom, L., ‘The Rise and Decline of Constitutional Culture of Hungary’ in von Bogdandy, A. and Son-
nevend, P. (eds), Constitutional Crises in the European Constitutional Area. Theory, Law and Politics in
Hungary and Romania (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG 2015) 14–45.
Szakaly, Zs., ‘A t€orteneti alkotmany es az alkotmanyos identitas az Alapt€orveny t€ukreben’ (The historical
constitution and constitutional identity in the light of the Fundamental Law) (2015) 3 Pro Publico Bono
– Magyar K€ozigazgatas 24–38. <http://uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/szakaly-zsuzsaa-torteneti-
alkotmany-es-az-alkotmanyos-identitas-az-alaptorveny-tukreben.original.pdf> accessed 10 August
2020.
Szente, Z., ‘A 2011. evi Alapt€orveny es a t€orteneti alkotmany €osszekapcsolasanak mıtosza’ (The Myth of the
connection between the historical constitution and the Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011) (2019) 12
K€ozjogi Szemle 1–8.
Szente, Z., ‘A historizalo alkotmanyozas problemai  a t€orteneti alkotmany es a Szent Korona az uj
Alapt€orvenyben’ (Problems of the quasi hstorical approach - The Historical constitution and the Holy
Crown in the Fundamental Law) (2011) 4 K€ozjogi Szemle 1–13.
Szente, Z., ‘Az angol es a magyar parhuzamos alkotmanyfejl}odes mıtosza’ (The myth of the paralel nature
of the Hungarian and the English historical constitution) (2016a) 9 K€ozjogi Szemle 23–32.
Szente, Z., ‘Challenging the Basic Values - Problems in the Rule of Law in Hungary and the Failure of the
EU to Tackle Them’ in Jakab, A. and Dimitry, K. (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values:
Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017) 456–75.
Szente, Z., ‘Populism and populist constitutionalism’ in Gardos-Orosz, F. and Szente, Z. (eds.), Populist
challenge to constitutional interpretation in Europe (Routledge 2021) 3–28.
Szente, Z., ‘The Doctrine of the Holy Crown in the Hungarian Historical Constitution’ (2013) 4 Journal of
the History of Law 109–15.
Szente, Z.,: ‘The Political Orientation of the Members of the Hungarian Constitutional Court between 2010
and 2014’ Constitutional Studies (2016b) 1. 123–49.
Szente, Z. and Gardos-Orosz, F., ‘Juridical deference or political loyalty?’ in: Szente, Z. and Gardos-Orosz,
F. (eds.), New challenges to constitutional adjudication in Europe (Routledge 2018) 89–110.
Toth, G. A. ‘Constitutional Markers of Authoritarianism’ (2019) 11 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 37–
61.
Tushnet, M., ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’ (2015) 100 Cornell Law Review 391–462.
Tushnet, M., Taking the Constitution away from the Courts (Princeton University Press 1999) 1–254.
Tushnet, M. and Bugaric, B., ‘Populism and Constitutionalism: An Essay on Definitions and Their Im-
plications’ Cardozo Law Review (2020).
Uitz, R., ‘The Illusion of a Constitution in Europe: the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the Fifth
Amendment of the Fundamental Law’ in Bell, J. and Paris, M-L. (eds), Rights-Based Constitutional
Review. Constitutional Courts in a Changing Landscape (Edward Elgar 2016) 374–405.
Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 27
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 06/16/21 01:16 PM UTC
Varga Zs., A., ‘T€orteneti alkotmanyunk vıvmanyai az Alapt€orveny kogens rendelkezeseben’ (The
Achievements of our Historical constitution and the Fundamental Law) (2016) 4 Iustum Aequum
Salutare 83–89.
Verschraegen, G., ‘Hybrid Constitutionalism, Fundamental Rights and the State’ (2011) 40 Rechtsfilosofie
en Rechtstheorie 216–29.
Vızkelety, M.: 5 eves az Alaptr€oveny. Valogatas az €unnepi konferenciasorozat beszedeib}ol (The Fundamental
Law is 5 years old. Selection of speeches from the festive conference series) (Magyar K€ozl€ony 2017)
1–301.
V€or€os, I., ‘A t€orteneti alkotmany az alkotmanybırosag gyakorlataban’ (The historical constitution in the
jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court) (2016) 4 K€ozjogi Szemle 44–57.
Way, L.: Pluralism By Default. Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics (John Hopkins Uni-
versity Press 2015).
Zetenyi, Zs. (ed.), A t€orteneti alkotmany –Magyarorszag }osi alkotmanya (The Historical Constitution - The
ancient constitution of Hungary) (Magyarorszagert Kulturalis Egyes€ulet 2010) 1–1164.
Zhang, T., ‘The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme People’s Court of China’ (2012) 25 Columbia
Journal of Asian Law, 1-61.
Viktor Orban’s Speech at the XXV Balvanyos Free Summer University and Youth Camp <http://
hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2014/07/31/viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-xxv-balvanyos-free-
summer-university-and-youth-camp-july-26-2014-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo/> accessed 10 August
2020.
‘hagyomany’ (‘tradition’), Dictionary of the Hungarian Language ≤https://www.arcanum.hu/hu/online-
kiadvanyok/Lexikonok-a-magyar-nyelv-ertelmezo-szotara-1BE8B/h-2E554/hagyomany-2E83E/?
list5eyJmaWx0ZXJzIjogeyJNVSI6IFsiTkZPX0xFWF9MZXhpa29ub2tfMUJFOEIiXX0sICJxdWV
yeSI6ICJoYWd5b21cdTAwZTFueSJ9> accessed 10 August 2020.
A t€orteneti alkotmanyunk is jogforras! – Horvath Attila a Mandinernek. (Our historical constitution is also
a source of law! – Attila Horvath to Mandiner) <https://jog.mandiner.hu/cikk/20161214_a_torteneti_
alkotmanyunk_is_jogforras_horvath_attila_a_mandinernek> accessed 10 August 2020.
LEGAL MATERIAL
Art. I. para (3) of the Fundamental Law
Act No. LXXXIII of 1995 on the national symbols of the Republic of Hungary
Act No. I of 2000 on the memory of the state foundation by St. Stephen and on the Holy
Crown
Point 2 of the Closing Provisions of the Fundamental Law
CC decision 16/2016. (X. 20.)
CC decision 85 22/2016. (XII. 5.)
CC decision 14/2020. (VII. 6.)
CC decision 3023/2016 (XI. 18.)
CC decision 45/2012. (XII. 29.)
CC decision 5/2013. (II. 21.)
CC decision 4/2013. (II. 21.)
28 Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 06/16/21 01:16 PM UTC
CC decision 6/2013. (III. 1.)
CC decision 28/2014. (IX. 29.)
CC decision 25/2018. (XIII. 28.)
CC decision 22/2019. (VII. 5.)
CC decision 3001/2019. (I. 7.)
CC decision 33/2012. (VII. 17.)
CC decision 28/2014. (IX. 29.)
CC decision 3002/2018. (I. 10.)
Laws CIV and CLXXXV of 2010.
Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) Reasoning [67]
Opinion of Zs. Andras Varga in the Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) of the Constitutional Court
Open Access. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are credited, a link to the CC License is provided, and changes – if any – are
indicated. (SID_1)
Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 29
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 06/16/21 01:16 PM UTC
